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ABSTRACT
CAROLINE ELLIOTT GILLESPIE: Parallels in Plight: Finding Commonalities in
African American and Latino Experiences in Post-Katrina New Orleans
(Under the direction of Charles Reagan Wilson)
Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast region on August 29, 2005 and caused
extensive damage throughout the affected areas. In New Orleans, flooding due to levee
breaches compounded the damage and created a need for a sizable labor force to clean up
and rebuild the city. Non-local Latinos overwhelmingly responded to this call and began
to arrive in New Orleans in the weeks after the storm. This influx sparked new tensions
between New Orleans' traditional low-income African American community and the new
group of low-income and often undocumented Latinos. Despite these tensions, both
African Americans and Latinos faced considerable and similar injustices in post-Katrina
New Orleans. These injustices did not affect Latinos and African Americans in identical
ways, but both constitute serious threats to the abilities of the two minority communities
to succeed in post-Katrina New Orleans. This work attempts to document three specific
scenarios of injustice and disadvantage—labor, housing, and criminal justice

that

constitute some of the issues most pressing to the Latino and African American
communities in post-Katrina New Orleans.

Ill

LITERATURE REVIEW
Since Hunicane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast in 2005, much time and effort has
been devoted to understanding the changing roles of African Americans and Latinos in
New Orleans. This literature approaches the study of African American and Latino
experiences in post-Katrina from a multitude of angles, from which several general
themes have emerged. One trend of current literature focuses on the statistical
demographic changes that have occurred since Katrina. Because of the extreme
demographic changes that occurred in New Orleans as a result of Katrina, documenting
and understanding these changes is necessary in order to fully comprehend the
experiences of African Americans and Latinos in New Orleans. A second general theme
in current literature tends to focus on the injustices in post-Katrina New Orleans.
Although not always specifically discussing the injustices that African Americans and
Latinos faced, this literature helps provide a fuller picture of the problems that New
Orleanians faced after the storm. From this general discussion of injustices, specific
injustices related to African Americans and Latinos become evident. A third, but much
smaller trend in literature, tends to focus on the ways in which Latinos and African
Americans faced similar discrimination and injustices. Understanding each of these
different yet interrelated trends in current literature helps clarify more clearly the roles
and experiences of African Americans and Latinos in post-Katrina New Orleans.
The first general theme examines demographic changes from a statistical
standpoint. The Brookings Institution and The Greater New Orleans Community Data
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Center (GNOCCDC) have invested considerable time in charting the changes in
population to understand how Katrina affected New Orleans' demographics and what
New Orleans’ population looks like now. GNOCDC’s reports “Who lives in New
Orleans and the metro aiea now?,” published in 2012, and “Homeownership. Household
Makeup, and Latino and Vietnamese Population Growth in the New Orleans Metro,"
published in 2011, both discuss extensively the changes in the African American and
Latino communities in terms of size, settlement patterns, wealth, education status of the
communities. Similarly, the Brookings Institution’s ’‘Katrina Index” and “Resettling New
Orleans: The First Full Picture form the Census” also give statistical bases that chart the
changing experiences and roles of African Americans and Latinos in New Orleans. This
statistical literature provides a very recent look at the state of African Americans and
Latinos in New Orleans and makes it possible to draw conclusions about their current
experiences in the city.
The second trend in current literature focuses on the injustices facing New
Orleanians after Katrina. Hartman and Squire’s There is No Such Thing as a Natural
Disaster: Race, Class, and Hurricane Katrina discusses the impact of Hurricane Katrina
from a variety of different lenses. The authors address issues of housing, education, and
crime in post-Katrina New Orleans and how problems within each of these systems
disadvantages certain minority groups based on gender, race, and age. Brunsma, Overfelt,
and Picou similarly approach Katrina’s effects from a multi-faceted view in their The
Sociology of Katrina. Perspectives on a Modern Catastrophe. It charts the experiences of
a variety of different groups (students, families, racial minorities, elderly residents, etc.)
in New Orleans before, during, and after Katrina to understand how each of these groups'

experiences in and perceptions of Katrina differed and overlapped based on the
discrimination and difficulties they faced.
Situated within this general trend of examining injustices is the strand of literature
that specifically examines the plights of African Americans and Latinos in post-Katrina
New Orleans as well as the ways in which these plights share commonalities. The
Advancement Project’s ‘‘And Injustice for All: Workers' Lives in the Reconstruction of
New Orleans” describes the challenges that African Americans and Latinos faced in the
post-Katrina labor market and the perspectives that emerged on the issue of labor after
Katrina. Oxfam America’s study

Building Common Ground” similaily seeks to

understand the ways in which African Americans and Latinos faced shared burdens in the
labor market, but it expands its scope to understand how African Americans and Latinos
faced discrimination in a variety of different societal settings. The Oxtam study also
seeks to understand how their plights overlap and the gains that African Americans and
Latinos can make based on alliance-building and the recognition that they face similar
problems.
Each of these trends offers a distinct perspective on the African American and
Latino experiences in post-Katrina New Orleans. Recognizing these different trends and
perspectives creates a more comprehensive understanding of the individual and shared
experiences African Americans and Latinos in post-Katrina New Orleans face. This work
incorporates and addresses each of these themes, as well as other trends that exist in
current literature, in order to accuralely portray the experiences of African Americans and
Latinos in New Orleans since Katrina.
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I. Introduction

When Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005, the city of New
Orleans breathed a sigh of relief. Although weather reports predicted New Orleans as the
direct point of landfall for the Category 5 hurricane, the storm decreased in strength and
shifted its course at the last minute,just sparing New Orleans. Instead of a direct hit from
a Category 5 hurricane. New Orleans suffered only a glancing blow from a lesser
Category 3 storm.
The sigh of relief was premature.
New Orleans’ levee system experienced breaches at dozens of different points,
allowing billions of gallons of water from the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain
to flood into the city even after the worst of the hurricane passed. The flooding was
worse, naturally, in the sections of the city with lower elevations. And in New Orleans
lower topography has always coincided with lower socio-economics.
There was a severe breakdown in communication among local, state, and national
officials. Abysmal pre-planning was exacerbated by even worse execution of the
inadequate disaster-response plans that did exist. These breakdowns hindered the rescue
and evacuation process for thousands of New Orleanians who had failed to comply with
the mandatory evacuation orders and remained in the city
1

whether by choice

or

because they lacked the financial means to go anywhere else. News footage showed
helpless residents stranded on roofs throughout the city. Particularly searing images and
accounts emerged of appalling misery and mayhem at the Convention Center and the
Superdome, where thousands of people—mostly poor and African American—waited on
relief.
It soon became apparent that this was not just a Category 3 hurricane. Rather,
Katrina’s effects on New Orleans came to be viewed as the “perfect storm'

●a hurricane

with effects that extended far beyond the death and physical destruction caused by wind,
storm surges, and rain. Although these are the images most often associated with the
concept of the perfect storm, the issue of race relations serves as an alternative view.
Katrina not only exposed longstanding racial issues; it created new ones of its own..
Historically, New Orleans functioned as a city dominated by African Americanwhite relations and featured a majority African American population. Latinos shared an
equally long history and presence in the city, but they constituted a much smaller
percentage of New Orleans’ population than the African American community. Thus,
they remained largely a silent minority. Because of this, African Americans and Latinos
in New Orleans had little cause or opportunity for interaction before Katrina.
This relationship in New Orleans, however, did not reflect the national trends in
African American-Latino interactions throughout the U.S. In metropolitan areas across
the U.S. Latino immigration had steadily risen since the 1980s. The Gulf Coast, in
particular, began to see a massive influx of Latinos throughout the late 1990s into the
2000s. The majority of Latino immigrants came for jobs specifically in the construction
industry, but found work in other low-skill industries as well. As Latinos increasingly

2

settled throughout the U.S. and became integral parts of the U.S. labor force, they
challenged the standing of African Americans as the U.S.’s traditional working class
minority. Tensions between the two communities flared, straining the potential for a
positive relationship between them.
Although New Orleans did not reflect these trends in African American-Latino
relations before Katrina, Katrina served as a catalyst that catapulted New Orleans into the
national trend. The reconstruction process after the storm demanded thousands of lowskill workers, and Latinos overwhelmingly responded to this call. As they established
roots in the city, however, the new Latino community came into closer contact with New
Orleans’ African American community. Almost overnight. New Orleans became a
microcosm of the growing issue of African American-Latino relations present in the rest
of the U.S. African Americans and Latinos in New Orleans competed for the same jobs,
and with this competition came the formation of the same perceptions echoed on the
national scale—African Americans assumed that all Latinos were illegal and stole their
jobs, while Latinos believed that African Americans were lazy and did not want to work
for their fair share. Suddenly, New Orleans became a stage where the tensions that had
taken decades to develop and heighten throughout the rest of the nation developed and
played out within a matter of months. Post-Katrina New Orleans offered a much more
time-compressed view of African American-Latino relations in the U.S. and it
was only
possible because of Katrina’s effects.
Although these tensions appeared to define African American and Latino
experiences in post-Katrina New Orleans as well as their interactions with each other, the
realities of their experiences present a different image. Both communities faced

3

significant discrimination in all sectors of society—labor, housing, criminal justice,
education, healthcare, etc.—that affected their ability to succeed

socially and

economically in New Orleans. The disadvantages present throughout society worked to
both geographically and socially isolate African Americans and Latinos from greater
society, leaving the two minority groups removed from those who might be able to help
improve their conditions. Although they both experienced this isolation and the
accompanying injustices and disadvantages, African Americans and Latinos did not carry
identical burdens. The injustices against them manifested themselves differently and
provided different challenges for African Americans and Latinos. Despite these
differences, the disadvantages facing African Americans and Latinos overlap in
fundamental ways that create parallels among their individual plights.
This work attempts to examine these realities and the paralleling problems that
continue to face African Americans and Latinos in New Orleans. In order to understand
how these issues play out, this work attempts to do several things. It first examines the
ways in which Hurricane Katrina acted as a catalyst in the formation of negative
perceptions. By providing a historical context of both African Americans’ and Latinos’
experiences in New Orleans before the storm, Katrina’s impact and the drastic changes in
African American-Latino relations that it caused become more clear. This work then
focuses specifically on three different issues—labor, housing, and criminal justice—that
each affect and disadvantage Latinos and African Americans in New Orleans. The first
issue. labor, focuses primarily on their shared disadvantage
in the clean up and
reconstruction process which took place in the months after Katrina. The competition
between African Americans and Latinos for these jobs constituted one of the major

4

factors in the formation of negative perceptions in post-Katrina New Orleans, but it
remains one of the issues that most disadvantageously and disproportionately affects
African Americans and Latinos in the city and their ability to succeed economically. The
issue of housing similarly disadvantages African Americans and Latinos. Discriminatory
ordinances, public housing, and homelessness, among other issues, affect both African
Americans and Latinos and limit their ability to live affordably and comfortably in New
Orleans. Criminal justice constitutes a third issue that negatively affects African
Americans and Latinos in post-Katrina New Orleans. The injustices committed against
them determined solely by the color of their skin serve to alienate African Americans and
Latinos from the New Orleans criminal justice system, thus leaving them vulnerable to
further exploitation. By examining these different issues, it is possible to see that the
resentment these two communities feel towards each other does not reflect the realities
that they both face in the city.

5

II. Katrina as a Catalyst: Shifts in African American-Latino Relations
and the Formation of Negative Perceptions

Long known as a city dominated by African American-white relations, New
Orleans underwent serious changes in its racial dynamics as a result of Katrina. Although
the city accommodated a small and established Latino population before the storm,
African Americans served as the prominent minority group prior to the storm, and there
was little cause for interaction between the two racial communities. Katrina, however.
caused a sudden influx of Latinos to New Orleans, thus creating a new low-income
minority in a city that already featured a prominent low-income African American
working class. This Latino influx challenged African Americans’ standing in the city and
sparked tensions between the two minority groups. Because of this, the stories that came
out of New Orleans in the months after the storm focused on the growing resentment
between the African American and Latino communities, especially among those in
competition for the same jobs. Tensions between the two groups flared as Latinos took
center stage in the cleanup effort, often under challenging and dangerous conditions for
little or no pay, while African Americans believed they were being pushed aside as this
new minority group took their jobs. In this way, Katrina
acted as a catalyst in the
formation of negative perceptions each community developed about each other.
6

Understanding these shifts in African American-Latino interactions and the role each
group held in the city before and after Katrina is essential to understanding the tensions
that developed and how these tensions and negative attitudes manifested themselves.
When French settlers founded the city of New Orleans in the early 1700s, it was
little more than a swampy outpost. Soon, however, it developed into a thriving port city
and cultural hub.' Throughout its early history. New Orleans operated under the control
of both French and Spanish rule, bringing in cultural, political, and demographic
influences from both, as well as influences from around the world because of the port
city’s extensive trading networks. Sociologist Elizabeth Fussell explained that during this
period, from the late eighteenth century to the mid nineteenth century. New Orleans
featured a “tripartite racial order” in which Anglo-American, African, and Latin
American cultures and people wove together to blur racial and cultural lines and form a
Creolized culture.^ African slaves built levees, cleared forests, and drained swamps
during the initial construction of New Orleans and they brought with them their cultures,
languages, and knowledge of crops and irrigation systems. The people of the Caribbean
and Latin America saw New Orleans as an attractive destination because of its proximity
and its cultural diversity. In 1809, for example, the city’s population almost doubled
because of nearly 10,000 refugees who fled the Haitian slave rebellion that lasted from

Peirce F. Lewis, New Orleans: The Making ofAn Urban Landscape(New York: Center for
American Places, 2003), 57
^ Elizabeth Fussell, “Constructing New Orleans, Constructing Race: A Population History of New
Orleans,” The Journal ofAmerican History 94(Dec 2007): 3, accessed December 15, 2012, http://0wwwjstor.org.umiss.lib.olemiss.edu/stable/25095147.
^ Amy Sumpter, Segregation of the Free People of Color and the Construction of Race in
Antebellum New Orleans,” Southeastern Geographer (May 2008): 4, accessed November 28 2012 doi:
10.1353/sgo.O.OOlO.
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1794-1804/ This melding of peoples and cultures encouraged constant interaction of
different peoples and cultures.
From the mid 1700s through the mid 1800s, the city’s neighborhoods and
residential patterns reflected the Creolized society and the “tripartite racial order”
established during the city’s phase of European control. By 1810, African slaves
accounted for about one third of the city’s total population. These slaves lived in close
proximity to their owners, regardless of neighborhood or region.'’ Similarly, free Creoles
of color, who also accounted for one third of New Orleans’ population by 1810, lived
throughout the city in mixed neighborhoods. Although there was some degree of racial
segregation visible in the residential patterns of these free Creoles of color during this
period, it was much less racially defined than what it would become in later decades. As
geographer Richard Campanella explained, it was a city of “salt-and-pepper” racial
residential patterns, in which each neighborhood represented a blend of the population.^
This fluidity provided an opportunity for people of different races and classes, especially
Africans and Creoles of color, to interact frequently.
The city’s fluid ideas of race and racial relations—and, therefore, the possibility
for interaction—began to change as the American presence in the city increased
throughout the nineteenth century. The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 ended the period of
European control and the racial fluidity that came with it. New Orleans slowly became a
city dominated by Anglo-American customs and ideas, thus replacing the concept of a
tripartite order with a “rigid, two-tiered” racial caste system defined solely by black and

^ Fussell, “Constructing New Orleans,” 3.
Fussell, “Constructing New Orleans,” 6.
^ Richard Campanella, “An Ethnic Geography of New Orleans,” Journal ofAmerican History 94
(Dec 2007): 2, accessed November 25, 2012,
http://www.journalofamericanhistory.org/projects/katrina/Campanella.html.
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whited During and after the Civil War, slaves in the surrounding area left their
plantations and came to New Orleans in search of work. This influx doubled the city’s
total African American population, which increased from 25,423 in 1860 to 50,456 by
1870. Faced with low incomes and racially segregated housing policies that excluded
them from more convenient housing, these freedmen were forced to settle in less
desirable areas of the city. While the freedmen were confined, for the most part, to these
back-of-town areas. Creoles of color remained where they had been in the lower-city
neighborhoods.^ The beginnings of residential segregation created geographical barriers
between Africans and Latinos, which diminished the opportunity for interactions between
the two groups—a problem that would persist into the next centuries.
Although economic stagnation in the South during the nineteenth century
curtailed the high level of Latin American immigration that occurred from the 1700s
through the early 1800s, Latino immigration to New Orleans significantly increased
during the first decades of the twentieth century because of Latin American wars of
independence and political violence. The unrest provided new trading opportunities with
the U.S., and many of these countries turned to New Orleans as a logical and convenient
port city. Banana and coffee trading companies in Guatemala, Honduras, and other Latin
American countries began to ship their goods to New Orleans and soon established strong
economic and cultural relationships with the city. Wealthy planters sent their children to
New Orleans for schooling and their employees to the city to establish company offices.
Political refugees from countries such as Cuba also flocked to New Orleans during this

^ Campanella, “Ethnic Geographies,” 3.
Campanella, “Ethnic Geographies,” 5.

9

period for safety during the violence in their home countries.^ By 1970, Census data
10

indicates that 50,828 Latin American immigrants lived in New Orleans,

Other estimates

suggest even higher numbers. According to the city’s Social Security Administration
office, for example, as many as 80,000 Latin American immigrants lived in New Orleans
by 1970.’* However, Latino immigration to New Orleans began to taper off again in the
1980s and continued to remain low throughout the next decades.
During this mid-century period of population growth. Latinos began to change
their traditional residential settlements in the city. In the 1950s and 1960s, New Orleans’
Latino residents began to move from the city itself to suburban parishes still within the
city limits but inside the New Orleans metro area. By 1970, Jefferson Parish and St.
Bernard Parish, both in the metro area, had Spanish-speaking populations of 3.64 and
9.17 percent, respectively, of their total populations. “ Simultaneously, as this metro area
growth occurred, the Latino population in the city declined. From 1980 to 2000, Jefferson
Parish’s Latino population increased by 49 percent while Orleans Parish’s Latino
13

population decreased by 23 percent.

Latinos continued to leave the city in large

numbers, widening their distance from the growing inner-city African American
population.
This Latino out-migration from the city to other metro-area parishes mirrored a
larger, simultaneous trend of white flight that occurred among New Orleans’ white

^ Thomas L. Karnes, Tropical Enterprise: The Standard Fruit and Steamship Company in Latin
America,(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 39.
Elmer Lamar Ross, Factors in Residence Patterns Among Latin Americans in New Orleans,
Louisiana: A study in Urban Anthropological Methodology(New York: Arno Press, 1980), 5.
Lewis, Urban Landscape, 58.
Ross, Residence Patterns, 6.
Allison Plyer, “Homeownership, Household Makeup, and Latino and Vietnamese Population
Growth in the New Orleans Metro,” Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, May 2011, 2 accessed
November 30, 2012,
http://www.gnocdc.org/HomeownershipHoueholdMakeupLatinosAndVietnamese/index.html.
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residents throughout the mid-1900s. Fearful of the increased racial integration that began
in the 1950s, middle- and upper-class whites left the city in favor of suburban areas. They
often employed racially discriminatory tactics to ensure their separation from African
Americans. In the 1930s, the Housing Authority of New Orleans constructed legally
segregated housing projects in the urban center of the city. When these projects integrated
in the 1960s, whites immediately moved away to suburban alternatives, leaving the
poorest inner-city African Americans to live in the projects and experience continued de
facto segregation. Such tactics worked to consolidate low-income African Americans in
14

the city with little chance of escape, a trend that is still evident today.

From 1960 to

1970, Jefferson Parish experienced a 61 percent increase in its population and St. Bernard
Parish experienced a 59 percent increase; simultaneously, Orleans Parish witnessed a 5.4
percent decrease.

Although other factors do play a role, many of these demographic

changes can be attributed to white flight. African Americans soon became the largest
demographic group in New Orleans.
By the 1970s, New Orleans’ Latino and African American communities featured
few economic or residential similarities—and, therefore, few opportunities or reason for
interaction. While African Americans accounted for a majority of the city’s population
and continued to grow, the Latino population remained small. The increase in Latino
immigration during the first half of the century had tapered off by the 1970s and 1980s.
From 1980 to 2000, while the national Latino population increased by 141 percent. New
Orleans’ Latino population rose by only 15 percent. The city’s Latino growth remained
so stagnant, in fact, that it no longer served as a significant gateway for Latinos coming to

14

Campanella, “Ethnic Geographies,” 7.
Ross, Residence Patterns^ 12.
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16

the U.S., even though its centrality as a port city since its founding,

By 2005, just

months before Katrina hit. Latinos accounted for three percent of New Orleans’
population, but represented slightly larger percentages throughout the New Orleans metro
area, where they made up six percent of the total population.'^ African Americans, on the
18

other hand, accounted for 67 percent of New Orleans’ population in 2005.

While

significant numbers of middle-class African Americans moved to suburban areas
throughout the second half of the twentieth century, most African Americans remained in
19

the city.

White flight served as a major contributor to the consolidation and growth of

the city’s low-income African American population, but others existed, as well. Many of
the jobs for the unskilled poor had shifted to the urban core during the mid-1800s, where
they continued to remain for low-income African Americans during the twentieth
20

century.

On the eve of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans’ African American and Latino

communities operated on separate trajectories with little cause for interaction, but Katrina
reversed these trends.
The effects of Katrina devastated New Orleans and all of its residents, but it
seemed to disproportionately affect the city’s low-income and African American
population. African Americans comprised 75 percent of the population that lived in
damaged areas in the city, more than 29 percent of the damaged area’s population lived

16

Plyer, “Latino Population Growth,” 1.
William H. Frey et al.„ “Resettling New Orleans: The First Full Picture from the Census,” The
Brookings Institution, September 2007, 8, accessed May 1, 2012,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2007/09/07katrinafreysinger.
18
Campanella, “Ethnic Geographies,” 11.
19
Campanella, “Ethnic Geographies,” 7.
20
Campanella, “Ethnic Geographies,” 5.
17

12

below the poverty line, and 10.4 percent did not have employment."’ Further, research
compiled by the Brookings Institution shows that those who evacuated the city—both
before and after the storm—were poorer, younger, and more likely to be African
American as opposed to those who remained in the city or returned after the storm."" This
suggests that low-income African Americans were among the most likely to leave New
Orleans because of Katrina. Once out of the city, it proved difficult for many of these
low-income African Americans to return to New Orleans quickly. A study conducted by
the U.S. Department of Labor found that housing, infrastructure, school, and job
opportunities all constituted major considerations in these evacuees’ decision of when to
23

return.

The study concluded that the cost to return for these low-income African

Americans, a disproportionate number of whom were renters and poor, was high and that
these considerations made it difficult for them to return to the city immediately."'’ These
obstacles help account for the decrease in the city’s African American population after
Katrina. From 2005 to 2006, New Orleans’ African American population decreased by 57
percent, from 67 percent of the total population to 58 percent.

This decrease signified

the financial difficulty that so many low-income African Americans faced in returning to
their homes.
In the days following Katrina, the necessity of a large-scale cleanup force became
apparent, but a labor shortage hampered the effectiveness of the reconstruction process.

21

John R. Logan,"The Impact of Katrina: Race and Class in Storm-Damaged Neighborhoods,"
Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences, 2006, 7, accessed November 19, 2012,
http://www.s4.brown.edu/katrina/report.pdf.
22
Frey et al., “Resettling New Orleans,” 13.
23
Jeffrey A. Groen and Anne E. Polivka, “Going Home after Hurricane Katrina: Determinants of
Return Migration and Changes in Affected Areas,” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, September 2009, 6,
accessed 24
November 19, 2012, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3000040/.
Groen and Polivka, “Determinants of Return Migration,” 18.
25
Frey et al., “Resettling New Orleans,” 7.
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Much of the city’s construction force, which included many low-income and low-skill
African Americans, had evacuated because of the storm. In the weeks and months
following Katrina, nearly half of New Orleans’ construction labor force still had not
returned to the city. Between August and September 2005, in the weeks leading up to and
following the storm, the construction labor force in the New Orleans metro area dropped
by 43.9 percent, from 40,100 workers in August 2005 to 22,500 workers in September
26

2005.

As the city scrambled to find enough construction labor to clean and rebuild the
city, non-local Latinos began to arrive to take part in the cleanup effort. These non-local
and often undocumented Latinos constituted an ideal construction force. With no
evacuated families or flooded homes to worry about. Latinos laborers could afford to
come to the city and work—unlike many of the low-income African Americans who
were not yet able to return to New Orleans. By early 2006, Latinos accounted for nearly
half of the reconstruction workforce. Of these new Latino laborers, 54 percent were
27

undocumented.

As evacuees began to return to the city in the weeks after the storm, local, state,
and national officials made hurried attempts to understand the post-Katrina demographic
makeup of the city to find out who came back and for what reasons. At first, Latino
growth throughout the metro area was thought to be minimal, remaining at about six

26

Amy Liu et al., “Katrina Index: Tracking Variables of Post-Katrina Recovery,” The Brookings
Institution, August 8, 2006, 21, accessed January 21, 2013,
^
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/200512_katrinaindex.pdf.
Laurel E. Fletcher et al., “Rebuilding After Katrina: A Population-Based Study of Labor and
Human Rights in New Orleans,” June 2006, 2, accessed May 1, 2012.
http://www.payson.tulane.edu/katrina/katrina_report_final.pdf.
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percent—the same percentage as before the storm.“^ However, the true growth of the
Latino population actually accounted for a much larger percentage, but proved difficult to
report because of the nature of the growing population. For the first months of postKatrina cleanup, these Latino laborers lived in extremely transitory and non-traditional
living arrangements. They lived in hotels, vans, under bridges, in tents, even in the
houses and buildings they were gutting. Because many of the population surveys
conducted immediately after Katrina did not take into account transitory quarters or
group housing, there was no way to accurately account for or record much of the new
Latino population.

Further, many undocumented Latinos feared legal repercussions,

such as deportation, so they avoided talking to government officials.

Although the

short-term Latino population trends remained unclear, long-term changes more accurately
depicted the changes in New Orleans’ Latino population. From 2000 to 2010, New
Orleans metro’s Latino population rose by 57 percent, significantly higher than the
31

national Latino growth rate of43 percent during the same decade.
Regardless of the inaccuracy of the earliest attempts to track the Latino population
changes in the city. New Orleans’ residents felt and saw the changes that the incoming
Latinos brought. Although pleased with the reconstruction of their city, many New
Orleanians and Louisianans expressed less happiness concerning those responsible for the
rebuilding. Often, they made their resentment towards the growing Latino community
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very visible. Louisiana Senator Mary Landrieu, for example, described it as
“unconscionable that illegal workers would be brought into Louisiana aggravating our
„32

employment crisis and depressing earnings for our workers.

Despite assumptions

made about their legal status and the general uneasiness that the city’s residents
expressed towards them, many of Latinos intended to stay as long as reconstruction jobs
continued and they began to set down roots in the city. Small Latino-run grocery stores
and restaurants began to pop up throughout New Orleans. The increasing number of taco
trucks parked at street corners garnered significant community disapproval. In 2007,
33

Jefferson Parish went so far as to ban the trucks from the parish.

Although the negative response towards Latinos emerged from a variety of
sources, the most acute response came from the African American community.
Immediately after the storm, as Latinos continued to arrive in the city, newspaper articles
began to speculate about how African Americans would feel about the Latinos, and about
how Latinos would affect African Americans in the city. In a speech several months after
Katrina, New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin asked what he could do to “stop New Orleans
34

from being overrun by Mexican workers.

In another speech, he pledged to return New

Orleans to its role as a “chocolate city” because “it’s the way God wants it to be. You
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can’t have New Orleans no other way.”'^"^ Although Nagin later apologized for these
statements and attempted to clarify what he meant by them, they sent a strong message
concerning the African American reaction to the growing number of Latinos: that the
city—and, more specifically, African Americans in the city—did not want them. As a
public African American figure, Nagin’s comments not only helped shape the African
American community’s response to Latinos, but they also established what type of
response would be permissible from African Americans towards Latinos in the future.
Other African Americans after Katrina echoed these negative sentiments. Gerod
Stevens, a radio station program director in New Orleans, told a Washington Post
reporter about the angry calls he received from African Americans every day. These
callers expressed their frustration about Latinos, whom they felt came to the city and took
jobs away from African Americans. They believed that Latinos attempted to “piggyback
on the gains blacks have made after hundreds of years of discrimination.” As one caller
put it: “Who has fought all of the civil rights, human rights battles since Day One? It’s
„36

been us.

In the minds of many African Americans, Latinos came to New Orleans, a city
long-defined solely by black-white relations, and began to redefine the existence of
African Americans. As Wilkinson pointed out, when “a new group enters, blacks may
recognize that Hispanics, just like any other racial group, will draw whites’ attention
away from blacks and more resources and privileges will be given to Hispanics. .37 For
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many African Americans, the Latino population influx constituted an attack on their
standing as a working class group in search of jobs, but it also constituted an attack on
their social and economic standing as a—even the-

minority group in the city. Latinos

threatened to redirect the focus previously placed on the African American community
onto their own needs and desires in their new city.
Confronted with such vocal negative attitudes, the new Latino population created
its own unfriendly attitude towards New Orleanians unhappy with their presence,
especially African Americans. The growing number of Latino laborers understood that
their role and significance in the reconstruction process that occurred in New Orleans
after Katrina. As day laborer Dennis Soriano explained, “[w]hen I arrived to this city, the
city was destroyed. We rebuilt it.

38

Considering the contributions they made to the

reconstruction effort, many did not understand why there remained continued distrust and
negativity towards them. Marco Topete, a Latino construction worker who came to New
Orleans from Houston after Katrina, remarked that “[ejven to this day, a lot of people do
not understand the idea of Hispanics...They have to get used to the idea that we are here
,39

to Stay.

These Latino laborers faced widespread forms of discrimination in the post-

Katrina construction workforce, often working difficult and dangerous jobs for little or no
pay for contractors who regularly took advantage of them. But the challenges of the
workplace were only compounded by the constant barrage of opposition from other
minority groups in New Orleans.
Latinos commonly responded by stereotyping African Americans as lazy. As
explained by Tomas Hernandez, a Salvadoran laborer who came to New Orleans from
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New York after the storm, “[t]here is this idea that we have come to take jobs away from
blacks. This is definitely not true because in the time that I have been here, I have never
seen a black man working beside me or looking for work like we do.

40

Latinos believed

that if African Americans wanted to work, they could, but they chose not to. Many
Latinos felt that African Americans, unwilling to work as hard as Latinos in the same
deplorable conditions, stood aside and watched as Latinos took their jobs. Latinos
laborers, frustrated by the negative attitudes that confronted them in New Orleans,
commonly adopted this attitude of African Americans.
The pervasiveness of racial tensions between Latinos and African Americans in
post-Katrina New Orleans has become the subject of much discussion and focus. In 2008,
Oxfam America commissioned a report on these tensions and perception between African
Americans and Latinos in New Orleans. The study found that 46 percent of African
American respondents “strongly/somewhat strongly” agreed that “Latino workers limit
job opportunities for African Americans” while 62 percent of Latino respondents
“strongly/somewhat strongly” disagreed that they limited job opportunities for their
African American counterparts."^* Both African American and Latino respondents also
conveyed varying levels of discomfort when asked how they felt about interacting with
members of the opposite community, whether at work or in social settings. Interestingly,
Latinos generally reported less enthusiasm about the possibility of working and
socializing with African Americans than African Americans reported about Latinos."*^
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Regardless, the tensions and

negative perceptions between Latinos and African

Americans towards each other appeared evident throughout the study.
Much of this can be attributed to what sociologist Silas Lee, who conducted the
Oxfam study, calls “the view from outside.” Both communities feel that they face
discrimination in several key areas (criminal justice, housing, job opportunities,
education, etc.) but both perceive that the discrimination facing their own community is
harsher and more apparent than the discrimination facing the other community—that the
43

other community experiences fewer problems in the same areas.

This view from outside

caused a breakdown in communication between African Americans and Latinos, which
has only served to exacerbate the negative perceptions they have of each other. Further,
this perception prohibits each community from understanding the real problems that
persist for both of them. The study found that discrimination towards African Americans
and Latinos in New Orleans was “more pervasive than isolated.” 51 percent of African
American respondents and 60 percent of Latino respondents believed that this
44

discrimination was a “major” problem that prevented them from succeeding in society.

It is important to note that these negative perceptions are not across-the-board
race issues that pit all African Americans against all Latinos in New Orleans. Although
these perceptions are based on race, it is also a class-driven issue. The Oxfam study
found that 38 percent of African American families earning $21,000 to $30,000
“strongly” agreed that Latinos limit job opportunities for them. At the same time, 39
percent of African American families earning $45,000 and above “strongly” disagree that
Latinos limit job opportunities for African Americans. Therefore, it is the “African
43
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Americans who are competing for the same low-wage, post-Katrina jobs as many
45

Latinos” who feel more threatened by the presence of Latinos in New Orleans.
Similarly, a study conducted by doctoral students at Louisiana State University found that
African American attitudes towards Latino immigration in New Orleans were more
favorable among higher-income respondents and less favorable among lower income
respondents because of the increased competition lower-income African Americans faced
46

in securing work post-Katrina.
Although

Katrina radically altered African American-Latino relations and

encouraged strife between the two communities, it also revealed the ways in which
African Americans and Latinos both faced similar burdens and discrimination in New
Orleans. It was not just a story of anger and resentment, but one of shared burdens and
paralleling plights. The following chapters focus on issues that significantly affect and
disadvantage African Americans and Latinos in post-Katrina New Orleans: labor.
housing, and criminal justice. By examining each of these issues, it is possible to see that
the resentment these two communities carry towards each other does not reflect the
realities that they both face.
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III. Exploitation and Exclusion: Latinos and African Americans in New
Orleans’ post-Katrina Labor Force

In the months following Katrina, one of the most visible sources of conflict and
hostility between African Americans and Latinos occurred in the labor market, which
was dominated by the construction industry and its need for thousands of low-skill
workers to help clean up and rebuild the city. Promises of high wages and long hours
meant, at least theoretically, that post-Katrina New Orleans provided an opportunity for
workers to earn considerably high salaries and work long hours. This hope, however, did
not translate into reality for minorities, especially Latinos and African Americans.
Instead, gross discriminatory practices characterized the reconstruction process and
served to disadvantage both Latinos and African Americans. Discrimination did not
affect African Americans and Latinos in the same way. Rather, the post-Katrina labor
system exhibited simultaneous exploitation of Latino workers and exclusion of African
American workers that locked Latinos in at the same time that it locked African
47

Americans out.

Their respective exploitation and exclusion meant that Latinos and

African Americans fostered different perceptions about their roles in the reconstruction
process, as well as the reconstruction process as a whole. Despite these differing roles
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and perspectives, both African Americans and Latinos shared in the discrimination and
disadvantage that characterized their time in the reconstruction labor force.
Katrina's destruction created a massive and immediate demand for construction
workers, at the very time that much of New Orleans’ indigenous labor force had been
displaced by the storm. The selective nature of return migration to the city following
Katrina, in which those more socio-economically advantaged returned first, suggested
48

that construction workers were not among the first to return.

In fact, New Orleans’

construction labor force experienced a drastic decrease in its size after Katrina. Between
August and September 2005, just before and just after the storm hit, the New Orleans
metro area’s labor force employed in construction and related industries dropped by 44
49

percent, from 38,500 workers in August to 21,600 workers in September.
When these construction workers did begin to return to the city, however, they
found the reconstruction process already well under way. Non-local individuals, who
faced none of the same economic considerations that confronted the local construction
force, arrived in New Orleans almost immediately after the storm to take part in the
clean-up and reconstruction effort. Latinos served as one of the largest and most
conspicuous components of the new labor force, accounting for nearly one half of the
50

total post-Katrina labor force.
The prominence of Latinos in the post-Katrina labor force reflected the late arrival
in New Orleans of a national trend in Latino immigration and employment. Beginning in
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the 1980s and 1990s, Latinos came in increasing numbers to the U.S. to find work,
predominantly in such low-skill industries as farming and construction. By 2003, workers
born in Central America and Mexico accounted for 21 percent of the national
51

construction labor force.

Latinos moved across the United States, following the

construction boom from region to region, most recently settling throughout the South and
the Gulf Coast region.
Although Latino immigration to the U.S. continued to increase. New Orleans did
not reflect the national trends in Latino population growth. Latino immigration to New
Orleans and the surrounding area remained sluggish during the 1980s through the 2000s,
even as Latino immigration—especially Mexican immigration—increased dramatically
throughout the Gulf Coast region. Between 1980 and 2000, the nation’s Latino
population grew by 141 percent, while the New Orleans metro region’s Latino population
grew by only 15 percent in the same time period.^" Prior to Katrina, New Orleans’
economy simply offered no compelling reason for Latinos to come there. According to
Fussell, Latinos “weren’t coming here [New Orleans] because the economy wasn’t doing
the things that attract Latino immigrants” such as agriculture, meatpacking, or, most
53

importantly, construction.
Katrina, however, changed the construction industry’s relevance in New Orleans,
thus rebranding New Orleans as an extremely attractive option for Latinos in search of
construction work. The abundance of jobs and the promises of high wages lured
thousands of Latinos to the city in the weeks following Katrina. For these Latinos, the
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city and its opportunities for monetary success represented “a modern-day El Dorado,
where the streets are paved with gold.

The opportunity that existed in New Orleans

after Katrina helped to account for the rapid Latino population increase after the storm
and the influx of Latinos into the city's construction workforce.
The federal government’s suspension of certain labor regulations in the aftermath
of Katrina further incentivized Latinos’ desire to come to the city. On September 6,just
one week after Katrina hit, the federal government suspended the Davis-Bacon Act, a
labor regulation which required that contractors and subcontractors pay their employees
no less than

the local

prevailing wage for government-contracted projects. The

government also suspended other regulations concerning employers’ responsibility to
identify employees’ legal status and affirmative action hiring practices. The suspension of
these regulations sought to help local construction workers and contractors who might
have lost their documentation in the storm come back to work quickly. More
significantly, though, these suspensions allowed contractors to hire workers without
verifying their legal status, which appealed to Latino workers who often came to the U.S.
without proper documentation. Word of this news spread quickly among Latino laborers
throughout the U.S. By 2006, undocumented workers accounted for 54 percent of the
Latino labor force in New Orleans.*'*’ However, as will be discussed later in this chapter,
these suspensions had other, more detrimental effects on Latino workers that were not
visible in the early stages of the reconstruction process.
During this unregulated, “wild west” environment in post-Katrina New Orleans,
negative attitudes about the newcomers began to surface. Comments by then-mayor of
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New Orleans, Ray Nagin, in which he questioned what he could do to ensure that New
Orleans was not “overrun by Mexican workers” highlighted the negative feelings New
56

Orleanians fostered towards Latinos.

Others echoed this contempt and uneasiness with

the growing Latino community, as well. During a November 2005 town hall meeting,
while Mayor Nagin fielded questions from angry residents, he spoke to one disgruntled
African

American

man

who explained that

I’m

working for six dollars an

hour!...They’re bringing in Mexicans and expecting us to work for the same money. Is
,,57

slavery over, or what?
On the opposite side of the debate. Latinos expressed disbelief and anger
concerning the labor situation. They felt frustrated that their hard work faced criticism or
went unnoticed by the city that so desperately needed help rebuilding. As one Latino
construction worker explained, “[w]hen I arrived to this city, the city was destroyed. We
rebuilt it...Do you want us to go back [home]?”'^^ Another laborer expressed his sadness
in the situation that faced Latinos in New Orleans. He explained that “[s]ometimes we are
walking and we have to look behind us... What can you do in a place where you are not
„59

wanted?

These emotions created a very tangible tension between African Americans,
angry at Latinos for taking their jobs and depressing wages, and Latinos, frustrated with
the cold reception they received as they came to help the city rebuild. This tension
between African Americans and Latinos, although new in New Orleans, only reflected
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the general stereotypes that African Americans and Latinos fostered towards each other
throughout the rest of the U.S.

the African American idea that Latinos took their jobs

and the Latino idea that African Americans did not want to work because of their
60

laziness.

Although negative attitudes between African Americans and Latinos persisted
throughout the reconstruction process in New Orleans, tensions escalated most rapidly
during the first phase of the clean up and recovery process. During this phase of
reconstruction, work consisted mainly of demolition, debris removal, and cleanup. This
work did not require a high level of skill, which attracted many of the low-skill Latino
61

laborers arriving in the city.

However, this work also provided an ideal opportunity for

low-skill African American laborers, many of whom had evacuated during the storm. As
they slowly came back to the city, they found the jobs available to their skill set in postKatrina New Orleans already taken by Latinos who had arrived to the city before them.
Yet, at the same time these tensions formed in the months after the storm, initial
reports of unfavorable working conditions also began to surface which seemed to alter
the perception of New Orleans as an “El Dorado” for Latino workers. Although this first
phase of clean up required the largest number of laborers, providing thousands of Latinos
with work, it also constituted some of the most hazardous and lowest-paying labor of the
62

reconstruction process.

Jobs during this phase brought workers in close contact with

hazardous materials such as mold and asbestos, but workers had little access to protective
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gear.

Laborers worked long hours in these grueling conditions, often 70 hours a week,
64

with high risks of disease or injury,

As one Latino remarked, “[t]his is no way to live. I

don’t know how much longer I can take it.”^'^ The work proved extremely demanding and
presented these Latinos with concerns that they did not anticipate upon arrival to the city.
The issue of wage theft compounded the problems that Latino laborers faced. As
the reconstruction process continued, workers began to complain that their employers did
not pay them the full amount promised or that they did not pay them at all. A study
conducted by UC Berkeley and Tulane in June 2006 found that 28 percent of
undocumented workers (all of whom were Latinos) and 13 percent of documented
66

workers reported problems regarding payment.

Further, many workers reported that,

despite the long hours they worked each week, they did not receive compensation for
67

overtime.

If they chose to confront their employers about their wages, they often faced

threats of legal action or violence. Contractors and employers also disappeared without
paying their employees or changed their identities so that even if they tried to, employees
could not find them. One Peruvian laborer recounted a story in which he worked for four
days on a project and on the day he intended to receive his pay, his employers left and
68

never returned. “It’s as if the earth had opened up and swallowed them,” he explained.

Another worker noted that “[w]hen we weren’t paid, we didn’t even have money for
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food...These companies are robbing us of our money after we worked so hard.
Workers had little explanation for the location of their wages and even fewer options for
how to get them back. The desperate financial situation they faced caused many to
consider leaving in New Orleans to return to wherever they had come from.
Much of the poor treatment that Latinos faced, such as the widespread accounts of
wage theft, can be attributed to the suspension of the labor regulations mentioned earlier.
Originally, these suspensions attracted Latinos to the city because they created an
environment with huge opportunity for employment and little threat of deportation. In
reality, however, these suspensions acted as a double-edged sword. Extensive problems,
such as the health concerns and wage theft, quickly replaced the early benefits that these
suspensions offered Latinos. As Fussell points out, “[w]ith the stroke of a pen, laws
,70

governing worker protections and fair hiring practices were legally ignored,

The

suspension of the Davis Bacon Act proved most detrimental to Latinos. Without Davis
Bacon in place, contractors did not have to pay their employees with regard to minimum
wage standards. This accounted, in part, for much of the wage theft that occurred in the
post-Katrina New Orleans labor market. On August 30, just one week before the
suspension of Davis Bacon, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
suspended regulations that enforced job safety and health standards. This suspension
made it possible for employers to avoid providing their employees with appropriate
71

safety gear.

Although the suspensions of these labor regulations intended to speed up

the reconstruction process and bring as many workers onto the scene as quickly as
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possible, it did not take long before the more negative consequences began to manifest
themselves. As the government began to realize the full effects of these suspensions, it
took action to put the regulations back in place (Davis Bacon, for example, was reinstated
on November 8, 2005, just two months after its suspension), but by then, it was too late.
A “culture of non-regulation” already existed in the city, in which oversight and
punishment for wrong-doing on the part of contractors did not exist. Because many of the
large contracts began while Davis Bacon and other regulations remained suspended, the
terms controlling the contract were “grandfathered in,” meaning that, for the remainder of
the contract, contractors did not have to guarantee their workers the wage and safety
72

standards that the regulations, when in place, guaranteed.

Increased dependency on employers further compounded the vulnerability and
disadvantage Latinos experienced in the post-Katrina labor market. When Latinos first
arrived in New Orleans in the weeks after the storm, they relied on their employers to
secure housing, food, and transportation because of the widespread damage and
electricity outages still present in the city. The issues of dependency increased
considerably for those Latinos who came to New Orleans not from other locations in the
U.S., but from their home countries in Central and South America. One Mexican laborer
working in New Orleans explained that after he and a group of friends saw
advertisements in their local paper for construction jobs in the U.S., they began the
process of applying to come to the U.S. They paid large processing fees and signed
contracts that tied them to certain contracting companies for a fixed amount of time.
These men then received their H-2B temporary work visas that allowed them to work
temporarily in the U.S. Lured by promises of high wages that they planned to send home
72
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to their families, they went to New Orleans to work in the cleanup effort. Once in New
Orleans, however, they worked only sporadically and did not receive adequate pay for
their labor. Despite the minimal work they completed under their assigned contractor,
they feared quitting or finding different side jobs. Under the terms of the contracts they
had signed, working for anyone but the original contractor constituted a punishable
offense—they could be fired and their visas could be revoked, leaving them
73

undocumented and with little financial opportunity to return home,

Their contracts.

therefore, forced the men to remain with their employers and depend on them for finding
work. In most cases, however, this dependency only resulted in contractors taking
advantage of Latino laborers.
The growing tendency of contractors to take advantage of Latinos resulted in a
system often portrayed as a form of modem day slavery—ironic in a city with such a long
history of slavery tied to the African American experience. Simultaneous dependence on
the system and exploitation by the system only served to hurt Latino workers who came
to help rebuild a city that was not their own. As Marielena Hincapie, director of programs
and staff attorney for the National Immigration Law Center, explained, “a lot of what
immigrant workers are facing is very much like slavery, which resonates with people of
,»74

the South, where the repercussions and discussion of slavery are still alive and well.

In

post-Katrina New Orleans a “plantation mentality” existed, in which employers and
contractors wanted a workforce but did not feel obligated to pay their workers.^^ They
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found their answer with the thousands of Latinos who came to the city in search of work.
Although as the recovery process continued and these Latino laborers made small strides
in their independence, much of their early time in New Orleans featured this
simultaneous dependence on and exploitation by their employers.
While Latinos faced exploitation in a system reminiscent of slavery, African
Americans faced different, although equally detrimental, problems in the post-Katrina
labor market. As the reconstruction process began, many African Americans still
remained evacuated from the city. Because of the geographical patterns of destruction
caused by Katrina, low-income African Americans faced disproportionate damage to
their homes. Parts of these low-lying neighborhoods remained flooded long after
floodwaters receded from other areas of the city, simultaneously forcing its residents to
stay away longer and increasing the damage caused to the houses. The extent of the
damage to the houses in these neighborhoods made it difficult for their low-income
residents to come back and rebuild. These considerations postponed the return of many
76

low-income African Americans to the city.

As they slowly trickled back, however, they

found that many of the low-skill jobs in the reconstruction labor force had already been
taken by non-local Latinos. As native New Orleanians—and Americans—^they felt
cheated out of jobs that should have been theirs, but that were instead given to thousands
of foreign workers, many of whom were undocumented.
African Americans, frustrated by their exclusion from the labor force, directed
their anger in several directions. First, and most prominently, they expressed anger with
Latinos. As one African American explained, “[b]ut when the immigrants came down
here they started underbidding....we worked too but when they underbid they start
76
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blocking the people that been here that really needs it.

This notion that Latinos

underbid or undercut the city's labor market constituted a frequent complaint among
African Americans. They believed that Latinos’ willingness to work long hours for
virtually no pay served to hurt the labor force as a whole, but as a competing minority
labor supply, they felt particularly disadvantaged by Latinos’ growing prominence in the
labor force.
African Americans expressed their anger not just with the Latinos who they felt
had taken their Jobs, but with the system that allowed this to happen—the contractors and
construction companies that facilitated the exclusion of African Americans from work.
They argued that these construction companies and contractors exacerbated and took
advantage of the competition between African Americans and Latinos in the labor force
to secure the cheapest labor possible. “It sends a bad message,” said Harry Alford,
president of the National Black Chamber of Commerce. He went on to explain that
“[w]hat they’re basically saying to the minority in New Orleans is, ‘We’ll make it harder
„78

for you to find a Job. And if you do, we’ll make sure you get paid less.

African

Americans felt they would have to lower their standards as American workers Just to get
hired in their own city—and their own country.
Further, African Americans faced racial stereotypes from the contractors and
employers that prevented them from working. As one African American worker
explained, “[t]hey told me they’re not hiring those looters from New Orleans,” a clearly
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racialized and discriminalory reference to African Americans that developed in the days
79

after Katrina as reports of looting throughout the city increased.
Anger towards the post-Katrina labor system did not exist solely among the
lowest-skilled African American laborers. African American construction contractors felt
excluded from the clean-up effort, as well. Under normal circumstances, a stipulation
requires that at least five percent of FEMA contracts be rewarded to minority firms, but
in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, the government waived or suspended several of
the regulations regarding contracts in order to get help to the city as quickly as possible.
These suspensions included affirmative action regulations, which aimed to ensure that a
fair amount of contracts went to minority firms. As a result, many no-bid contracts
awarded after the storm went directly to larger firms with little local connection.^^ This
left smaller, local, and often African American firms excluded from the clean-up process
81

in the first months after the storm hit.

As Derrick Lawrence, an African American

landscaper and contractor in New Orleans, explained, “I have brothers right now that
would love to go to work, but there’s so much bureaucracy and red tape...It’s just been a
discouraging situation for a black man in this area to get a job.

>82

Further, African Americans felt that, even in their own city, they could not look
for work in the same ways that Latinos could. After the storm, large groups of Latinos
commonly congregated at certain points around the city to look for work. These meeting
places served as “open air markets” for contractors to come to and hire workers for
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different jobs.^^ Lee Circle, for example, serv^ed as one of the most well-known gathering
spots, but others existed throughout the city. One African American expressed his
disbelief that it would work the same way for African Americans looking for work as it
did for Latinos. He explained that “1 know full well that Tve been blessed to have been
born here and not have to stand on the comer. But to be perfectly honest with you, I don’t
believe you could stand on the corner. If you put 75 black guys standing in front of the
Home Depot on Elysian Fields, 1 guarantee you'd have 90 policemen there in about 15
84

minutes.

This perception, echoed by many African Americans, only served to broaden

the divide between African Americans and Latinos and their views of each other.
As the reconstruction process continued, the plight of African American and
Latino workers became more apparent and local, state, and federal officials made
attempts to correct the inequalities that African Americans and Latinos faced in the job
market. By this point, however, the culture of non-regulation already served to
disadvantage African Americans and Latinos in ways that made it extremely difficult to
find fairness and equality in the system. Instead, the simultaneous Latino exploitation and
African American exclusion during the reconstruction process left the two minority
communities in a situation that plagued them both with the realities of institutional
discrimination.

Although they often focused on the job competition and resulting

tensions that divided them, the same labor competition that divided them ultimately
served to unite them in a common struggle against institutional discrimination that faced
both minorities in the post-Katrina New Orleans labor force.
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IV. Disadvantage and Isolation: Housing in Post-Katrina New Orleans

The widespread Hooding and destruction throughout New Orleans caused by
Hurricane Katrina ensured that the issue of housing would constitute a major concern in
the storm’s aftermath. Immediate questions of housing presented themselves for New
Orleans’ displaced residents. Katrina scattered evacuees throughout the United States
who went in search of temporary housing while they waited to hear the status of their
homes in New Orleans. While these evacuees, many of whom were African American,
experienced housing woes away from the city, Latinos experienced a set of different, yet
equally challenging circumstances in New Orleans as they tried to take part in the
rebuilding process. Long-term questions of how to rebuild the city also appeared, as did
concerns about what the city’s future “footprint” should look like. These questions
persisted beyond Katrina’s immediate aftermath and continue to affect Latinos and
African Americans. Discriminatory ordinances, public housing, and homelessness are
among the most pressing issues that face African Americans and Latinos in their search
for adequate and affordable housing and each serve as examples of the issues that shape
the experiences of Latinos and African Americans in New Orleans. Combined, these
issues caused both minority groups to experience a very physical isolation from greater
society, which further served to disadvantage African Americans and Latinos. Although
36

they do not share identical struggles in their attempts to find housing, these issues remain
critical components in the struggle these two minority communities face in finding
adequate and affordable housing in New Orleans.
During the first months after Katrina, African American out-migrants from and
Latino in-migrants to New Orleans both faced the inadequacies and stresses associated
with transitory and transitional living. For African Americans, these stresses of
transitional living took place, for the most part, outside of New Orleans. Because housing
damage disproportionately affected lower-income African Americans, New Orleans outmigrants after the storm were poorer and more likely to be African American.^^ But, in an
effort to secure temporary housing after the storm, they faced a temporary housing
program that, as National Low Housing Coalition CEO Sheila Crowley described, “could
not have been more poorly designed and executed if it had been purposefully intended to

fail.

,86

Although shelters across the country adequately housed and fed thousands, the

extent of damage in the city meant that evacuees needed to find longer-term temporary
housing, such as rental housing. Worried that such a large influx of African Americans
into the housing market might result in a higher amount of housing discrimination in
violation of the federal Fair Housing Act (established as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1968), the National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA) conducted a test program from
September to December 2005 that measured the extent to which landlords used racially
discriminatory tactics to select renters and how this affected African Americans. NFHA
which conducted the program in Georgia, Florida, Texas, Tennessee, and Alabama,found

Frey et al.. “Resellling New Orleans,” 13.
Sheila Crowley, “Where Is Home? Housing for Low-Income People After the 2005 Hurricane '
in There Is No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster: Race, Class, and Hurricane Katrina, ed. Chester
Hartman and Gregory D. Squires(New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 2006), 121.
86

37

that in 66 percent of the lest

43 of 65 separate tests—landlords used discriminatory

methods against pt)tential African American renters as opposed to potential white
87

renters.

NFHA used a \ ariety of different methods during the program, some of which
-88

The report found that landlords offered

revealed egregious types of discrimination.

discounts to potential white testers, failed to tell African American testers about available
apartments or return calls to African American testers, and quoted higher prices to
African American testers.
Other violations of the Fair Housing Act existed, as well. In December 2005, the
Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center(GNOFHAC)filed complaints with the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development(HUD)accusing five internet sites
of using racially discriminatory practices. The use of internet sites that sought to match
Katrina evacuees with potential volunteers across the country willing to temporarily
house storm victims became a common occurrence after Katrina, but GNOFHAC
accused five of these sites of publishing “illegally discriminatory ads” in which
volunteers asked for evacuees that were not African American. FEMA funded and
90

sponsored one of the sites.

These violations of the Fair Housing Act, as well as other

unreported violations and racially discriminatory attitudes, made it considerably more
difficult for African American evacuees to find housing after the storm.
While African Americans confronted issues of temporary housing away from
New Orleans, Latino in-migrants also faced stressful and unstable issues of housing in
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New Orleans. Mostly non-local and challenged by the lack of access to basic amenities
such as running water or electricity, these Latinos faced extreme difficulty in finding
affordable and adequate housing in New Orleans. Hotels and motels either proved too
expensive for many laborers to rent or they remained closed after the storm. Trailers were
also expensive and not always in close proximity to worksites. Because many laborers
did not have cars or were

told by their employers not to bring them, transportation

presented another obstacle in the search for convenient and easily accessible housing.
During the first phase of reconstruction. Latino laborers lived in a variety of extremely
transitory and unstable settings, none of which presented ideal or even adequate living
conditions in terms of cleanliness or privacy. Thousands lived in large group settings
such

as

warehouses

or

hotel

ballrooms and conference

rooms. These spaces

accommodated as many as several hundred people, but the proximity in which they lived
meant an increase in tensions that often resulted in violent disputes.^’
Because of the obstacles that faced Latinos in finding housing, many relied on
their contractors or employers to find housing for them during the first phase of
reconstruction, but this often presented additional problems. Often, contractors recruited
Latinos to New Orleans by guaranteeing housing and meals for their employees.
Although this attractive offer convinced many Latinos from across the country to sign
contracts and come to New Orleans, employers often broke these promises. Laborers
arrived in the city to find much less than they expected. They lived in large group
housing and did not receive adequate food or access to basic amenities that their
92

employers had guaranteed.
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Despite broken promises, workers increasingly relied on their employers for
housing and

additional

support. As one laborer explained, “[t]hey [employers]
93

brainwashed us” into staying in the city despite the poor living conditions and low pay.

Workers needed to provide for their families that they left behind in other cities, so they
often had no other choice but to accept the housing employers found for them and the
wages they paid them. As Raoul Arcentales, a Mexican laborer who left Mexico to come
to New Orleans after Katrina, explained, “[tjhey keep saying, don’t worry, here’s your
housing, there’s your food, we're going to place you [in work]. But meanwhile, the
family is waiting for us to send money...

If workers complained about their living

conditions and pay or quit their jobs, their employers could take away their living
arrangements, thus turning them onto the streets with few alternative options. As
Arcentales explained, “[r]ight now, he has to pay for our hotel and food. If we start
working for someone else he could just say ‘they are no use to me. and kick them out.95
Living on the streets without employment was not an option for these laborers who had
come to earn money for their families, so compliance with the housing and support—or
the lack of—that their employers provided remained their only option.
Although Latino laborers constituted a crucial component during the first stage of
clean up and reconstruction in New Orleans, construction work began to slow in late
2005 and into early 2006. The problem reflected not a lack of available construction
work, but rather the city’s dilemma in deciding where and how to rebuild. New Orleans
is a bowl-shaped city that sits, on average, about six feet below sea level and is
surrounded by Lake Pontchartrain, the Mississippi River, and various other bodies of
93
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water and marshlands. To keep this water out. New Orleans relies on an extensive
96

network of levees that pumps water away from the city.

As Katrina showed, however,

this levee system failed miserably, breaehing at dozens of points and causing extensive
flooding throughout the city's lowest-lying areas. Once the repairs to the levee took place
and the floodwaters subsided, city leaders faced the perplexing issue of how to deal with
these low-lying areas. It was, as Tulane geographer Richard Campanella titled it, “the
great footprint debate." New Orleans' “footprint"—its spatial and geographical reaches
into the environment around it

grew into many of these low-lying areas throughout the

mid twentieth century during a period of population growth.^^ But, in the aftermath of
Katrina, the city’s population declined drastically and left much of this space empty. In
2006, nearly a year after the storm. New Orleans’ population still remained only about
one half of its 2005 pre-Katrina population.

With such a decreased post-Katrina

population, city officials needed to determine whether or not rebuilding in these lowlying areas constituted a worthwhile goal, especially considering that these same areas
would surely bear the brunt of inevitable future flooding caused by hurricanes or other
natural disasters.
The possible effects of shrinking New Orleans’ footprint extended beyond
geographical, environmental, or ecological concerns by speaking to issues of race and
class that had long been present in the city, but had yet to be revealed in such a stark light
until Katrina. Most of the low-lying areas in the footprint debate featured low-income.
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99

predominantly African American populations.

New Orleans East, Gentilly, and

Broadmoor, three low-lying areas among those hardest-hit by Katrina, featured preKatrina African American populations of 87 percent, 70 percent, and 69 percent.
respectively. The Lower Ninth Ward, another area heavily populated by African
Americans (96 percent), also suffered severe flooding, but it was not as low-lying as the
other targeted areas; the flooding here occurred because of the proximity of two
100

Industrial Canal levee breaches on the western side of the Lower Ninth Ward.

Further,

these neighborhoods featured higher rates of poverty and unemployment among their
101

residents than other areas of the city.
For these low-income African American residents, the question of whether or not
the city would allow them to rebuild was absurd. As Campanella explained, “that’s where
the trouble started. Suggesting that some residents would not have the ‘right to return’ to
102

their homes proved very bitter and contentious.

For these residents, it was as if the

city government was telling them that their neighborhoods were not important and that
other areas—other people, races, ethnicities—had priority over their survival in the city.
As Lower Ninth Ward resident Caroline Parker explained, “I don’t think it’s right that
103

you take our properties. Over my dead body.
Residents directed much of their anger towards Mayor Nagin’s Bring New
Orleans Back Commission, which formed in late 2005 to address the debate over the
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city’s footprint and determine where and how to rebuild. After conducting research for
several months and contracting w ith outside firms for additional opinions, the Committee
released its decisions and recommendations in January 2006. Instead of immediately
deciding whether or not to rebuild in the targeted low-lying areas, the Commission
delayed making a decision until FEMA could release new Elevated Flood Level maps in
April 2006; these maps would act as indicators to determine which areas would be safe to
104

rebuild in.

The Commission also recommended the creation of “neighborhood planning
areas in all neighborhoods across the city to prove their commitment to rebuilding.
Intended to “help the citizens of New Orleans take action on their future,” these plans
intended to demonstrate community commitment to the rebuilding of their own
105

neighborhoods.

The stipulations of these plans included, among other things, the

assurance that a majority of the residents had already moved back or were planning to
move back by early summer 2006. Residents of the targeted neighborhoods, however,
fostered skepticism towards the plausibility of this plan. “I don’t think four or five
months is close to enough time given all we would need to do,” explained Robyn Braggs,
106

a resident of New Orleans East.

With extensive damage and neighborhood residents

still scattered across the U.S., repopulating these neighborhoods in such a short period of
time proved a more difficult process than repopulating the neighborhoods that had
sustained less damage. Further, because these neighborhoods had disproportionately
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poorer populations than less affected neighborhoods, their residents were less likely to be
able to afford to rebuild or repair the damage done to their homes.
After months of debating, FEMA released its maps in April 2006. Contrary to
what many expected, the maps offered relatively lenient guidelines, allowing residents to
107

rebuild as they saw fit.

Regardless, the debate over the footprint disproportionately tied

up low-income African Americans in months of back-and-forth debate, speculation, and
tension while whiter, wealthier neighborhoods escaped this dispute and rebuilt much
108

earlier in the reconstruction process.
The footprint debate, although finally resolved in a manner that pleased most
residents in the targeted low-lying areas, did not represent the beginning or the end of the
housing debate in New Orleans or the perceived assault on minorities’ standing in the
city. Other policies and conditions, both explicit and subtle, negatively and
disproportionately affected African Americans, Latinos, and other minorities in New
Orleans after Katrina. These discriminatory tactics and conditions have made it more
difficult for Latinos, African Americans, and other minorities to find adequate, and
affordable housing in New Orleans since Katrina.
One of the more explicitly racist moves in the post-Katrina housing market has
been the implementation of discriminatory housing policies that target minorities. A
series of ordinances enacted by the St. Bernard Parish government offers one of the
clearest examples of policies aimed at keeping minorities out. St. Bernard Parish, located
within the New Orleans metro region, featured a majority white population before
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Katrina—86 percent of the total population in July 2005.

St. Bernard, like other

parishes in the metro region, sustained extensive damage during Katrina and lost much of
its housing stock. During the reconstruction process, however, St. Bernard chose to be
selective in how it allowed the reconstruction and rebuilding of its damaged housing
stock to progress. In November 2005, the parish government imposed a twelve-month
moratorium on the construction or re-establishment of any multi-family dwelling. To
many, this moratorium represented the parish government’s discriminatory attempt to
keep racial and ethnic minorities out of the predominantly white parish. Traditionally,
minorities are more likely to live in multi-family homes and to be renters than whites are.
New Orleans reflected these trends in minority housing patterns. In the New Orleans
no
metro area, African Americans are twice as likely as whites to live in rental housing.
111

Between 2004 and 2009, Latino rental rates in New Orleans increased by 44 percent.

Because the tendencies of multi-family home housing patterns tend to fall along racial
lines, St. Bernard’s moratorium appeared to be a directed assault on minorities. In a case
filed against the parish in January 2012 by the United States under the terms of the Fair
Housing Act, the plaintiffs argued that the moratorium “disproportionately disadvantaged
»112

African-Americans seeking to rent housing in St. Bernard Parish.

Although the case

focused solely on the negative effects for African Americans, these discriminatory
ordinances affected other minorities, including Latinos, in the same ways.
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Amidst the initial backlash against the moratorium, St. Bernard Parish put in place
a blood-relative ordinance” in September 2006, which prohibited homeowners of single113

family homes from renting their homes to anyone not related to them by blood.

The

blood-relative ordinance further discriminated against minorities attempting to live in the
parish because

whites accounted for 93 percent of the parish’s single-family

1 14

homeowners.

In response to the blood-relative ordinance, parish president Craig
»115

Taffaro said that “all we're doing is saying we want to maintain the demographics.

Although this use of discriminatory tactics and policies affected both African
Americans and Latinos, other examples of discriminatory policies aimed directly at
Latinos also constituted additional problems for Latino renters. In 2011, GNOFHAC
conducted tests

much like the ones conducted in 2005 to monitor the level of

discrimination against African

American evacuees—to measure the amount of

discrimination directed towards Latino renters in the New Orleans metro area. It found
that in 35 percent of the test cases, landlords chose white renters instead of Latino renters.
This statistic, however, fell in line with national trends. It was not until GNOFHAC
began to examine the stories of potential Latino renters more closely that it uncovered the
discrete ways in which Latinos faced severe discrimination and exploitation in the rental
market. Latino renters and housing activists reported that landlords often charged higher
rents for less valuable properties and neglected to do necessary repairs and upkeep for
their Latino renters. Landlords

engaged in these discriminatory practices because they
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assumed that their Latino renters were illegal immigrants and that they had fewer legal
il6

rights to fight back against the discriminatory practices.

The plight of public housing in post-Katrina New Orleans is another issue that has
disproportionately disadvantaged minorities, including African Americans and Latinos,
and that has opened a very contentious and racialized debate about the role and future of
public housing in New Orleans. Prior to Katrina, public housing complexes housed about
1 17

5,000 people.

118

of which nearly 100 percent were African Americans.

The buildup in

African American representation in public housing occurred slowly throughout the
twentieth century. The first public housing complexes in New Orleans were built in the
late 1930s as racially segregated units—some complexes for whites and others for
African Americans. In the 1960s, as the result of integration and the white flight that
accompanied it, African Americans began to increasingly comprise the majority of public
housing complexes in New Orleans. Katrina, however, forced these residents to evacuate,
and their return to the city was slow.
In their absence, questions began to arise concerning the future of public housing
in New Orleans. Many viewed Katrina as an opportunity to change the nature of New
Orleans public housing. In late 2005, for example, U.S. Representative Richard Baker of
Louisiana commented that “[w]e finally cleaned up public housing in New Orleans. We
,U19

couldn’t do it, but God did it.

Many found offense at his comment, which they

believed spoke more about the new absence of low-income African Americans from New
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Orleans than it did on the actual state of public housing. But for other city, state, and
national officials. Baker's words echoed a growing sentiment that Katrina did, in fact.
make it possible to “clean up" public housing. City and Housing Authority of New
Orleans (HANO) officials argued that public housing complexes were in an increasing
state of decay, and that the damage caused by Katrina accelerated this process. Because
of this damage, officials did not allow residents to come back to the city’s public housing
complexes for several months after the storm. In June 2006, nearly one year after Katrina,
HUD announced that it planned to demolish four of the largest public housing complexes
in New Orleans: St. Bernard, Lafitte, C.J. Peete, and B.W. Cooper. These four
complexes, known collectively as the “Big Four,” accounted for more than 4,500 public
housing units. They needed to be demolished, HUD explained, because of the damage
120

sustained to them during the storm.

In their place, HUD planned to build mixed-

income developments which, officials argued, would de-concentrate poverty by mixing
people of different economic backgrounds.

HUD Secretary Alphonso Jackson claimed

the demolition of the Big Four and the redevelopment of mixed-income developments
122

would serve as a “renaissance” for the city’s neighborhoods.

Officials cast it as an

opportunity to improve public housing for its residents and the people of New Orleans.
Many public housing residents, as well as other critics in the community, found
extreme fault with officials’ plan to demolish the Big Four, and viewed it as no more than
a masked attempt to keep minorities out of the city. St. Bernard housing complex resident
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Endesha Jukali explained that “[t]hey've had an agenda for St. Bernard for a long time.
but as long as people lived here, they couldn’t do it. So they used the disaster as a way of
cleansing the neighborhood when the neighborhood is weakest...This is a great location
for bigger houses and condos. The only problem is you got all these poor black people
123

sitting on it.”

In June2006, after HUD announced its plans for demolition, public

housing residents filed a suit against HUD and HAND claiming that the housing
124

complexes they intended to demolish could be fixed without being razed,

Further,

residents found fault with officials who refused to let them return to their homes for
several months after Katrina; they believed that officials’ decision to deny residents’
return to the housing complexes stemmed not from the concern over actual damage to the
complexes, but from an attempt to grant themselves more time to plan and secure
125

permission for the demolitions.

Despite vocal opposition to the demolition of the Big

Four, the city’s plans went ahead and piecemeal construction began on the new mixedincome complexes. Many public housing residents, however, still remained unhappy. As
former C.J. Peete (now Harmony Oaks) resident Bobbie Jennings said after moving into
126

the new unit, “[i]n their eyesight it might be better but in my eyesight it’s not.

The redesign of public housing created a scenario in which not all of the previous
public housing residents would be able to live in public housing complexes, causing
additional problems for public housing residents in New Orleans. Because the new
mixed-income developments increased the amount of units available at market rates, the
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amount of units available for low-income public housing residents decreased. HUD, in
order to provide those eligible for public housing but who remained waitlisted or did not
receive public housing units, increased the number of housing vouchers that it provided.
Housing vouchers, part of the Housing Choice Voucher Program established by Section 8
of the Housing Act of 1937, provide eligible public housing residents with a voucher that
they are able to use to towards rent payments on non-goverament run housing units.
In theory, the concept of the voucher system works to de-concentrate poverty by
allowing voucher recipients alternatives to public housing complexes and letting them
decide for themselves where to live, but conditions in post-Katrina New Orleans tested
this theory. Because of the large amount of housing stock damaged or destroyed by the
storm, a housing shortage emerged after Katrina. As a result, both housing and rental
prices throughout the metro area skyrocketed. By August 2006, exactly one year after the
storm, rent prices for the metro region had spiked by 39 percent of their pre-Katrina
127

rates.

Although housing prices increased, wages did not increase at a similar pace,

which made it even more difficult to pay rent. Cassandra Morris, a lifelong New Orleans
resident, voiced her concern about the effects that rent increases had on renters’ ability to
continue living in New Orleans. She explained that New Orleans was “only for the rich
folks. There is not going to be Section 8 homes. No one can afford to live here anymore.
They want to take the little bits of pieces we had and the houses that poor people have
built.
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The increase in rent, however, did not solely affect Section 8 voucher holders
Rather, it affected low-income minorities throughout the city. After Katrina African
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Americans and Latinos comprised major portion of New Orleans’ renters. The share of
Latino renters in New Orleans increased by 44 percent from 2004 to 2009, creating a
larger Latino renter population in the city than it had ever experienced. Although the
number of African American renters in the city decreased after Katrina (reflective of the
high African American out-migration rate), a considerable share of African Americans
129

still rented in 2009 (44 percent).

These factors served to disproportionately affect

African Americans and Latinos, along with other minorities, in the search for affordable
rental housing.
Because the increase in rental prices after Katrina made it impossible for
thousands of New Orleans’s residents to afford housing, homelessness became a serious
issue in the city. By 2010, homelessness in New Orleans had nearly doubled since
130

Katrina, to about 12,000 people.

Many of the homeless lived in the abandoned

buildings not yet restored or demolished since sustaining damage in Katrina or other
recent hurricanes. In these abandoned buildings, the homeless faced terrible conditions
131

including toxic molds, lack of food, and exposure to the elements.

Tent cities also

began to pop up throughout the city and acted as makeshift, semi-permanent communities
for homeless people. One, in particular, formed outside New Orleans City Hall so that
city officials, including Mayor Nagin, would be forced to see them every day. This group
of homeless New Orleanians hoped that, if city officials saw them every day, their plight
might become a more pressing concern. The groups made daily chants of “Hey, Ray!
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How about a house today!" outside Nagin’s office window with the hope that the city
132

would take action.

Homelessness was particularly an issue for Latinos in post-Katrina New Orleans.
Since their arrival in the city after Katrina, thousands of Latino laborers became homeless
while they worked to rebuild the city. When large group living arrangements, such as
shelters or warehouses, filled to capacity. Latinos left with no other options began to
sleep on the streets or in cars and vans. Workers also slept in the same damaged and
gutted buildings and houses that they worked on during the day. Those lucky enough to
secure rooms in hotels or motels often found that they could not pay the bills because
their employers underpaid them or did not pay them at all, leaving them with little or no
money for living expenses. Hotel staff threatened them with calls to ICE if they did not
leave, so those who could not pay, by no fault of their own, went back to the streets. Tent
cities, as mentioned earlier, became a popular living arrangement for Latinos during the
reconstruction process. However, officials attempted to remove these tent cities in early
133

2006 as the city prepared for Mardi Gras.

Post-Katrina New Orleans’ housing crisis and debates have disproportionately
disadvantaged minorities, including both the large number of African American residents
who returned after Katrina as well as the large influx of Latinos who came to the city for
the first time after Katrina, preventing them from finding affordable housing. Because of
this, isolation of low-income minorities became a major problem. The homelessness
discussed earlier serves as one form of isolation, but there are others. The Section 8
voucher system, although intended to “de-concentrate” poverty, had the opposite effect
“Katrina Homeless Make Tent City of Despair,” Associated Press, February 11 2009 accec<?ed
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A report compiled by The Lens Contributor Ariella Cohen noted that, instead of
integrating Section 8 voucher holders into the community, people have remained
separated by financial status. According to Southeast Louisiana Legal Services attorney
Amanda Golob, “[i]n practice, it has not changed very much. Everyone is in the same
.,134

neighborhoods.

Further, Cohen found that many recipients “feel their choices are

limited because landlords in more affluent neighborhoods do not accept vouchers, and
that recipients tend to look for housing in neighborhoods they are familiar with or have
family or friends, which means that many move to areas with demographics similar to the
„I35

community they left.

Voucher recipients ended up living in the same neighborhoods

with no real gains in the goal of the de-concentration of poverty. Because of this.
poverty—regardless of race—remains concentrated, isolated from greater society and
from the people who have the financial and political power to help change their status.
Although this isolation created a geographical and a physical distance between
low-income minority groups and greater society, it also created a more internal divide.
African Americans and Latinos realized the effects of such isolation, as well as other
factors, on their ability to live and succeed in the city. These realizations and the
knowledge of their struggles in housing prompted both African American and Latino
respondents of the Oxfam “Building Common Ground” study to cite housing as a major
obstacle in finding equality in New Orleans. 66 percent of African American respondents
and 59 of Latino respondents felt that “access to decent affordable housing” served as a
“major” problem and contributed to the barriers both groups felt they faced to succeed in
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society.

The housing system in post-Katrina disproportionately disadvantaged and

isolated African Americans and Latinos in fundamental ways that served only to
perpetuate the struggles they faced.

J

I

I

i
i

I

I

136

a

Building Common Ground,” 2.

54

V. Criminal Injustice: Latino and African American Disadvantage in
Post-Katrina New Orleans’ Criminal Justice System

The issue of criminal justice in post-Katrina New Orleans serves as one of the
most compelling and yet most difficult issues to dissect and comprehend in terms of its
effects on African Americans and Latinos. Issues of corruption and mismanagement
plague New Orleans’ criminal justice system in ways similar to other metropolitan areas.
New Orleans, however, differs from other metropolitan cities in that its legacy and extent
of corruption, mismanagement, and discrimination present in its criminal justice system
are much more ingrained and far-reaching. The consequences of this corruption and
mismanagement within the criminal justice system fall disproportionately on those who
cannot afford to fight back; low-income minorities are increasingly becoming police
targets for criminal offenses. Hurricane Katrina and the resulting breakdown in law and
order that occurred compounded the racial discrimination that has long plagued New
Orleans. As the city recovered from the physical destruction of the storm, corruption and
discrimination in the criminal justice system remained. This discrimination, which has
disproportionately affected African Americans and Latinos (as well as other minorities),
has damaged these minorities’ ability to rely on the criminal justice system and has
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alienated them from the system, thus allowing continued exploitation of these two
groups.
The issues that play out in New Orleans’ criminal justice system are not unique to
the city. Rather, they are present throughout the United States, especially in other large
metropolitan cities. Racial discrimination manifests itself at all points along the criminal
Justice system process—from arrest to jail time to access to defense lawyers to sentencing
time, race plays a part. New Orleans is no exception to the system of “criminal injustice’
and yet, in many ways, it goes beyond the issues that confront the criminal justice system
throughout the rest of the nation. New Orleans has an extensive and record-breaking
history of crime, but it has an equally deep-rooted and controversial legacy of scandal,
mismanagement, and inefficiency in its police department and other branches of the
city’s law enforcement. The 1990s marked the height of police scandal in New Orleans.
A 1996 New York Times article entitled “The Thinnest Blue Line” chronicled some of the
problems facing the city’s police department at the time. The article noted that “in recent
years the department has behaved less like a police force than a loose confederation of
137

gangsters terrorizing sections of the city.

During the 1990s, New Orleans Police

Department (NOPD) officers took part in cases of bank robberies, murders, rapes, and
drug rings, among other things. One of the most infamous cases to come out of this
period of NOPD misconduct centered on Len Davis, an officer targeted by the FBI during
a sting operation that caught Davis and ten other officers guarding nearly 300 pounds of
cocaine planted in an empty warehouse by FBI agents. During this drug investigation, the
FBI wiretapped Davis’s phone and agents overheard Davis, in an unrelated incident to the
137
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drug sting, ordering the murder of a woman who filed a police brutality report against
him.13S Cases like this hindered New Orleans’ ability to trust in such a mismanaged and
corrupt law enforcement system.
Although NOPD began to make slight progress throughout the later 1990s into the
early 2000s, Hurricane Katrina halted this progress and instead compounded and
exacerbated many of the long-standing issues that already affected the city’s criminal
justice system. Almost immediately, the storm affected the ability of the city government,
including the police department, to maintain order over deteriorating conditions
throughout the city. The rising floodwaters left precinct buildings and vehicles
underwater. Flooding severely limited officers’ mobility—their cars were useless and the
deep water in the streets meant that they could not access many areas by foot. Boats
provided more mobility for officers, but they proved difficult to acquire and still did not
139

give the police department the extent of control necessary to maintain order in the city.

Further, widespread power outages and wind damage to telephone lines and towers
severely limited communication between police officers and other city officials. Radio
towers for emergency response radio systems sustained damage during the storm,
replacement batteries for radios malfunctioned or lost charge, and cell phone towers did
not function. Communication between the department’s authorities depended largely on
word-of-mouth, and messages were often mixed up, confused, or took long periods of
time to relay. The inability to communicate and limited mobility severely constrained
officials’ ability to operate properly in the first days after Katrina. As one officer
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explained, “nobody knew who to communicate with. Nobody knew who to take
directions from. The radio system went out. At that point we lost all communications.
There was no backup plan as to if, you know, we lost radio communications, how we
would be able to communicate. Every district basically was on their own. Every officer
was on their own and, basically, did whatever they thought they had to do.
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The lack

of manpower further hindered the ability of the police force. The storm stranded many
officers in flooded homes while others who evacuated before the storm remained away
from the city. Some officers failed to show up; in the aftermath of the storm, 250 officers
141

abandoned their jobs.

Additional law enforcement and rescue support mshed onto the

scene in the days after the storm to aid the overwhelmed local law enforcement agencies,
but communication between the various agencies remained jumbled and the challenges
remained in the attempts to reestablish order.
While bureaucracy lagged in a timely and efficient response and communication
remained a problem, the media began to paint a vivid picture both of the damaged city
and the storm’s victims. Footage of the Superdome and the Convention Center, as well as
that of victims stranded on roofs in deep floodwaters, showed the city’s poorest residents
who could not afford to evacuate before the storm. They were,for the most part, the faces
of African Americans. But along with these images of the storm’s victims came
increasing reports of violence and crime throughout the city, especially at the Superdome
and the Convention Center. Mayor Nagin spoke of people “in that frickin’ Superdome for
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five days watching dead bodies, watching hooligans killing people, raping people.
Reports surfaced of violent and armed mobs roaming the streets, of snipers shooting at
the helicopters attempting to rescue people stranded on their roofs, and of murders and
rape. The spread of these rumors closely paralleled the image of the victims, and the
media played its part in connecting African Americans with the rumors of violence and
crime reportedly taking hold of the city. Without widespread and legitimate channels of
communication, law enforcement could not quell these rumors, so they continued to
spread. Although the media reports were exaggerated, they helped shape the response to
the situation and to the victims in New Orleans—including the response from law
enforcement. The juxtaposition of images of African Americans and widespread crime in
the city criminalized African Americans, so law enforcement, with minimal forms of
legitimate communication to negate these rumors, began to treat African Americans
throughout the city as criminals. As Mother Jones contributor James Ridgeway explained
in his article “The Secret History of Hurricane Katrina,

‘what took place in this

devastated American city was no less than a war, in which victims whose only crimes
,»143

were poverty and blackness were treated as enemies of the state,

There existed a clear

racial connection to the rumors and reports of crime in the city.
One of the most widespread media-created concepts that began to emerge in the
days after the storm was the image of the “looter.” Stranded residents without mnning
water, electricity, or a way to get out began to take advantage of nearby unattended
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grocery stores for basic necessities: food, bottled water, toilet paper, etc. As the media
reported on people breaking into stores, different images of the people involved in these
actions began to take shape. A more suspicious eye was cast towards African Americans
as they broke into the stores, while whites were often given the benefit of the doubt. An
assumption formed that whites’ survival depended on procuring these items while
African Americans stole goods for less noble reasons. Incidents such as the one that took
place on Yahoo’s internet homepage in the first week after the storm fueled the
increasingly racialized debate over survival versus looting. Two images (from different
photographers and different news outlets) both depicting storm victims wading through
floodwaters with supplies from local stores, appeared next to each other on Yahoo’s
homepage. One showed a white couple walking through floodwaters with supplies. The
caption noted that the couple was shown “after finding bread and soda from a local
grocery store.” The second picture showed an African American man with a case of soda
and a grocery bag. The caption for this photo read that the man had just been “looting a
144

grocery store.

The respective news outlets quickly jumped to defend the wording

associated with each photo, explaining that they encouraged their photographers to write
what they saw. The man who photographed the white couple did not actually see them
stealing goods, while the photographer of the African American man did see the man take
the goods from the store. The juxtaposition of these photos and their captions are
anecdotal, and because they did not come from the same news agency, it is difficult to
determine the racial motivations behind them. Yet they still speak to the greater issue of
race in the aftermath of Katrina and the increasingly negative perceptions associated with
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African American victims of the storm. As one political blog summed up, “[i]t’s not
..145

looting if you're white.

The image of the looter became intricately linked to African

Americans, and law enforcement acted on this. This is not to say that looting and its
connection to African Americans did not constitute an actual issue. looting for less noble
reasons did take place in New Orleans and African Americans did take part in this, but
African Americans did not act alone in the looting that occurred after Katrina and more
frequently acted out of necessity instead of for personal gain.
Although the media played a significant role in associating African Americans
with crime after the storm, civilians and law enforcement legitimized these perceptions
through their treatment of African Americans—treatment which worked to further
criminalize African Americans. As reports of looting and other forms of violence and
crime continued. Mayor Nagin and the police department became increasingly desperate
to re-establish order. Later, officers reported that during the first days after the storm,
their superiors gave them permission to take back the city at whatever cost—^including
permission to “shoot to kill” looters and other criminals. Some officers claimed they
heard the order from police superintendent Warren Riley, who, according to one former
officer, said. [i]f you can sleep with it, do it.
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Riley denied ever giving officers

permission—whether implied or explicit—to shoot at looters. Although never confirmed
as to what extent this message was communicated or who the order came from, the
communications breakdown and the resulting debate over whether or not officers

145

Ralli, “Who's a Looler?”
Sabrina Shankman et al., “Law and Disorder: After Katrina, New Orleans Police Shot
Frequently and Asked Few Questions.” ProPublica, July 24, 2012, accessed March 19, 2013,
http;//www.propublica.org/nola/story/nopd-order-to-shoot-looters-hurricane-katrina.
146

61

received permission to shoot to kill blurred the lines of what NOPD considered
acceptable treatment of New Orleans’ citizens in the days after the storm.
Regardless of the debate over whether the police received direct orders to “shoot
to kill” or make rash decisions concerning violence towards supposed criminals,
considerable instances of police brutality and misconduct did occur after the storm.
Stories of civilian murders that involved police topped the headlines. Because African
Americans accounted for a majority of these victims, it is nearly impossible to view these
crimes without considering the effects of criminalization of African Americans after the
storm and how this criminalization affected the police response. Although they went
unreported at first, they turned into some of the most well-known cases that emerged
from Katrina.
Among the murder investigations, the Danziger Bridge incident remains one of
the most well-known and controversial incidents of police misconduct and bmtality
against African Americans in post-Katrina New Orleans. According to both police reports
of the incident as well as the official NOPD internal investigation, on the morning of
September 4, seven police responded to calls for back-up from an injured officer at the
Danziger Bridge. The seven officers who responded to the call claimed that when they
arrived at the bridge, at least four armed civilians fired at them. The officers returned fire,
injuring several and killing two. They then arrested Lance Madison, one of the men on
the bridge, and charged him with eight counts of attempted murder against police
147

officers.

However, after several of the shooting victims began to file civil suits against

the police department and other external investigations published their own findings,
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NOPD's version of the Danziger Bridge incident began to crumble. In order to avoid
criminal action against themselves, the officers involved had fabricated their account of
the story. They never received a call for back-up and there was no injured officer who
had supposedly made the call. While witnesses did report hearing gunshots nearby, none
of the victims on the bridge had guns—they only wanted to escape the city in search of
family or food. The police failed to follow proper procedures upon arrival to the scene
and instead began to immediately fire at the civilians, who began to scatter and run. One
of the fatalities, Madison's mentally challenged brother, Ronald Madison, suffered seven
gunshot wounds (although the police only reported shooting him once), five of which
entered through his back. The other fatality, a young African American man named
James Brissette, also suffered gunshot wounds as he attempted to run for cover from the
officers’ fire.
Violence against perceived African American looters was not restricted to the
police, but also involved other private citizens, as well. Other cases exist that involve
citizens engaging in acts of violence against African Americans with no consideration for
whether the victims actually committed a crime. In his article “Katrina’s Hidden Race
War,” The Nation columnist A.C. Thompson chronicled the plight of Donnell Herrington
and his two companions, all African Americans, as they tried to escape the city on
September 1, just several days after Katrina hit. They planned to go to the Algiers ferry
terminal, where they hoped to catch an evacuation bus out of the city, but before they
could make it to the ferry terminal, three white men shot at them and yelled, according to
148

Herrington, “[g]et him! Get that nigger!

The white men then interrogated Herrington
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and his two companions because they believed that the three African Americans had
come to the neighborhood to loot empty houses. As Marcel Alexander, one of
Herrington’s companions, explained, “[t]hey said they was gonna tie us up, put is in the
back of the truck and burn us. They was gonna make us suffer...! thought I was gonna
149

die. I thought I was gonna leave earth.

After the white shooters released the three

men, they rushed Herrington to a nearby hospital, where he received emergency surgery
to remove at least seven pellets found in his neck. Later, when Herrington went to check
on the issue at the police station, he found that no one had filed a report of the incident.
The white shooters that targeted Herrington and his companions belonged to a
larger vigilante militia group that emerged in the neighborhood of Algiers Point, a largely
white neighborhood in the Algiers region of New Orleans, in the days after the storm.
The militia, which formed after a young African American man assaulted one of the
neighbors and then stole his car, operated under a “siege mentality” and established their
150

own form of law and order.

Their form of law and order, however, came with racial bias. As Thompson noted,
“some of the gunmen prowling Algiers Pont were out to wage a race war.” One woman,
whose uncle and cousins participated in the militia group, explained that “[m]y uncle was
very excited that it was a free-for-all—white against black—that he could participate in.
i
For him, the opportunity to hunt black people was a joy.” Although anecdotal, the Algiers
Point militia speaks to the larger issue of discriminatory violence against African
Americans after the storm.
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As weeks and months passed after Katrina, New Orleans began to clean itself up,
rebuild, and reestablish the law and order that the city had so desperately needed in the
days after the storm. The reestablishment of law and order, however, did not imply that it
would be a system without flaws. High crime rates continued, as did police corruption
and mismanagement. The lack of community tmst in the police department became such
an issue that in 2011, at the insistence of Mayor Mitch Landrieu and community activists
(including Romell Madison, the brother of the Danziger Bridge victim Randall Madison),
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) launched an investigation into the mismanagement
and misconduct of the New Orleans Police Department. The resulting report offered a
harsh review of NOPD’s shortcomings and problems. The report noted that “[f]ar too
often, officers show a lack of respect for the civil rights and dignity of the people of New
Orleans” and that “the Department has failed to take meaningful steps to counteract and
eradicate bias based on race, ethnicity, and LGBT status in its policing practices, and has
151

failed to provide critical policing services to language minorities.
The effects of these shortcomings directly impacted African Americans and
Latinos, as well as other minority groups, in New Orleans. The report noted, for example.
that NOPD officers routinely disregarded the Fourth Amendment by “engaging in a
pattern or practice of stopping, searching, and arresting individuals without the requisite
152

reasonable suspicion or probably cause,

This disregard for the Fourth Amendment is

closely related to the issue of discriminatory policing, which the report also discussed.
The report explained that “[d]iscriminatory policing occurs when police officers and
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departments

unfairly

enforce the law—or fail to enforce the law—^based on

characteristics such as race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, religion, or LGBT status.

153

The report cited discriminatory policing in New Orleans as a major problem, one that
could help account for extreme disparities in African American to white arrest rates in
154

New Orleans in all age divisions and crime categories,

In the report, the DOJ summed

up the effects of discriminatory policing by noting that “[t]he Department does not have a
sufficiently comprehensive policy regarding discriminatory policing, fails to adhere to
155

those policies that are in place

and that these issues “serve to drive a wedge between
^5

the police and the public, antagonizing and alienating members of the community.
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Although the issue of discriminatory policing affected both African Americans
and Latinos, the rapid increase in the Latino population in New Orleans after Katrina
presented this growing community with its own, unique problems of discriminatory
policing and other issues in the criminal justice system, thus shaping its own distinct
relationship with New Orleans law enforcement. The threat of detention or deportation by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) serves as one issue that frightened Latinos
and affected their relationship with police. A widespread connection exists between
46

9^

Latino

and “illegal,” and police in New Orleans acted on these assumptions by

targeting Latinos, regardless of legal status, as illegal immigrants. Fussell noted that.
44

Latino migrants’ physical characteristics and Spanish language use have become
indicators of their legal status in the minds of law enforcement officers, employers, and

153 .

‘Investigation,” 31.
‘Investigation,” 38.
155
‘Investigation,” 34.
156 ,
‘Investigation,” 35.

154

66

.,157

the public more generally.

This assumption on the part of police officers proved

especially common for Latino construction workers—both legal and illegal—during the
reconstruction process.
Language barriers presented an additional problem for Latinos and the police in
New Orleans. The DOJ report found that NOPD was “dangerously limited in its ability to
communicate effectively and accurately” with victims who did not have sufficient
1-58

command of the English language.

For thousands of exclusively Spanish-speaking

Latinos who arrived in the city after Katrina, equal protection and policing by NOPD did
not come as a guarantee as it did for English speakers. The report also found that NOPD
did not have a sufficient number of translators for Limited English Proficient (LEP)
speakers. Police who responded to calls from LEP victims could not effectively
communicate in Spanish, thus adding additional stresses to the situation. Further, the
report noted that police officers did not to respond to calls that came from LEP victims as
159

frequently because of the hassles that the language barriers would present.
Police brutality also affected the ways in which Latinos responded to the police
department. Before Katrina, excessive force already constituted a major problem within
NOPD, especially for African Americans. As the Latino population increased after the
storm, however, they also began to experience similar cases of police bmtality. One
Salvadoran laborer explained that an officer stopped him and several Latino friends,
pointed a gun at them, and robbed them. The laborer noted that “he didn’t tell us why he
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stopped us. He pointed a gun at us...There was nothing we could do. Told us that next
160

time he saw us he was going to kill us. He was going to shoot us.'
The fear that law enforcement instilled in Latinos, especially among those in the
U.S. without proper documentation, affected their ability to tmst the police, which further
victimized them and isolated them from the criminal justice system. Although wage theft
constituted a major problem for Latino laborers after Katrina, they seldom reported these
incidents because contractors, without regard for the actual legal status of the Latmo
laborers, threatened to report them to ICE if they attempted to report incidents of wage
theft to the authorities. One laborer explained that employers “didn’t want to pay us, but
you know that you can’t get involved with them because we are Latinos and they are
Americans.

161

They understood that to “get involved” with their employers over

payment for work would result in a call to ICE, a call they could not afford.
Further, because of their tendency to carry large amounts of cash instead of going
to the bank. Latinos earned the title of “walking A.T.M.s” after Katrina and regularly
suffered robberies, beatings, and harassment.

Most Latinos refrained from calling the

police to report these incidents. But for those who did decide to call the police, they often
faced treatment as criminals rather than victims. Police who arrived on the scene
demanded to see their documentation papers, rather than file a police report on the
robbers.

Trust issues between Latinos and the police became such an issue that the

Orleans Parish police department established “El Protector,” a program aimed
160
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specifically at reaching out to the area's Spanish-speaking population and encouraging
IM

them to report crimes.
Although Latinos, and especially illegal Latinos, desperately tried to avoid run-ins
with law enforcement, it became an inevitable aspect of life in New Orleans after the
storm. As one Mexican laborer explained, “Hispanos can’t even walk down the street;
-16.^)

they get picked

up and deported.

Immigration raids frequently occurred at

construction sites and at meeting sites where contractors picked up day laborers for work,
such as Lee Circle. If Latinos could not show their documentation papers, police arrested
them and sent them to jail or detainment centers, where they awaited sentencing that
often resulted in deportation.
The conditions in these detainment centers presented their own set of civil rights
issues for Latinos that further distanced Latinos from New Orleans law enforcement and
disadvantaged them in ways that made it difficult to fight back. One Louisiana detention
center, in particular, gained national attention for its treatment of Latino undocumented
immigrants after Katrina. Located in Basile, Louisiana, the privately-run South Louisiana
Corrections Center operated under a contract with ICE to house undocumented
immigrant detainees from around the region, including New Orleans. In July 2009, the
New Orleans Workers Center for Racial Justice compiled a report of complaints from
detainees, many of whom were Latinos and had come to New Orleans and the
surrounding area to work after Katrina. The report cited “egregious violations” of civil
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166

rights and human rights for the detainees.

Many of the detainees’ accounts focused on

the deplorable living conditions and their health concerns that went uncared for by staff.
One detainee named Juan Marin Corona explained that he had both leukemia and
diabetes, but that the detention center failed to treat him for these illnesses. He confessed
that “I am preparing to die here in detention. I hope my body will provide testimony that
.U67

the system needs to change.

Other detainees reported that the detention center did not

give them access to legal representation and did not inform them when their lawyers
came to speak to them. One detainee explained that “no immigration lawyer has come to
visit me. I was never given a presentation about my rights and immigration did not give
me a pamphlet on my rights and responsibilities. I was not given a list of free
168

attorneys.

Language barriers presented another problem at Basile. The staff only

allowed detainees to submit requests or complaints in English—Spanish was not
169

accepted.

As one detainee summed up: “We are not animals, and don’t deserve to be
170

treated like animals. We are human beings.
Although not identical, the injustices against African Americans and Latinos in
the New Orleans criminal justice system worked to disadvantage both communities in
ways that challenged their ability to succeed in the city. Racial profiling and stereotyping,
excessive force and brutality at the hands of police officers, and discriminatory
misconduct have victimized the two communities. This is not to say that all African
Americans and all Latinos were completely innocent in New Orleans, either before or
166 .
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after Katrina; many African Americans were guilty of looting, theft, drug charges, and
other crimes. Many Latinos who came to New Orleans both before and after Katrina did
come illegally, without proper documentation. These violations surely warrant legal
action and proper punishment. But it appears that in post-Katrina New Orleans, a city
already riddled with issues of racial equality and criminal injustice, race, as much as
actual guilt or innocence, predetermined their treatment.
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VI. Conclusion: Katrina’s Silver Lining

The issues of labor, housing, and criminal justice are just a selection of the
multitude of issues that face African Americans, Latinos, and other minority groups in
post-Katrina New Orleans and hinder their ability to succeed economically and socially
in the city. Although Katrina created many of these problems, others were nothing new
for a city with such
new and old

long history of poor race relations. These different issues—both

melded together to form serious obstacles for African Americans and

Latinos in post-Katrina New Orleans. In revealing, exacerbating, and creating these
problems, though, Hurricane Katrina simultaneously created an opportunity for African
Americans and Latinos

as well as the city of New Orleans as a whole—to move beyond

these obstacles, to learn from them, and to fix the inadequacies
that tormented the city
Although specifically referring to the opportunities for the criminal justice system in New
Orleans, Community United for Change leader W.C. Johnson’s comments that [wje’re
looking at a point in time where we have an opportunity to have a true revolution in New
Orleans and we don’t have to fire a shot...We’ve got to take advantage of thaf
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-i.

apply to

171

the greater story of New Orleans after Katrina.

Although Katrina raised so many

questions of inadequate and discriminatory policy, injustice, and inequality, it also
brought awareness to these issues and presented the city with a situation in which it could
make amends and move beyond these problems.
The opportunity for change has been realized, at its most basic level, by African
Americans' and Latinos' acknowledgement that they face the same obstacles in postKatrina New Orleans. In the years since Hurricane Katrina, growing numbers of Latinos
and African Americans in New Orleans have come to realize the similarities in their
plights and the commonalities in their experiences. Executive Director of New Orleans’
Twomey Center for Peace Through Justice Theodore Quant explained that it is the ability
of African Americans and Latinos to sit down together that allows them to understand
their similarities rather than to dwell on their differences. He explained that when these
two groups sit down together, they have the ability to “look at what is our current reality
and instead of being polarized, we can begin to stand on the same side and say,‘What do
you need? How do you see this? This is what I need. How can we get there together?
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This realization has given African Americans and Latinos a commonality, thus relieving
some of the most negative tensions between them and creating a basis for alliance.
Although this acknowledgment of similarity and bonding based on commonality is not
present in totality in both communities, it is a growing number.
Once African Americans and Latinos began to realize the commonalities of their
plights, united attempts at reform became an option—a necessity even. In fact, the Oxfam
171
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America “Building Common Ground" study found that 60 percent of African American
respondents and 55 percent of Latino respondents felt that it was “very important” for the
two communities to “establish alliances to achieve social and economic equity;
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African Americans and Latinos began to form alliances, both official and unofficial, in
order to see the change they knew was necessary for them to succeed in New Orleans.
Their calls for reform and alliances became part of a larger reform movement that took
place in post-Katrina New Orleans. The issues of labor, criminal justice, and housing, in
particular, have all witnessed growing consciousness, alliance, and attempts at reform
that serve to benefit African Americans and Latinos. The New Orleans Workers’ Center
for Racial Justice (NOWCRJ), for example, reaches across racial and class lines to fight
injustices in both the housing and labor sectors. Formed as a response to the post-Katrina
injustices evident in New Orleans, NOWCRJ serves as the umbrella organization for
several different programs, each with a different aim in regards to equality in housing and
labor. There have also been attempts to reform the criminal justice system. At the
insistence of Mayor Mitch Landrieu and other community activists, the Department of
Justice launched an in-depth review of the shortcomings of the New Orleans Police
Department that concluded in 2011. The acknowledgement of mismanagement and
misconduct within the system constituted the first step towards real action to right these
wrongs. The extent of misconduct that the study reported also served to make the issue of
criminal justice reform a more pressing issue.
Katrina provided not only the potential for reforms that affect African Americans
and Latinos, but that affect the state of New Orleans as a whole. New Orleans has long
prided itself as a melting pot of cultures and people. Its cultural system during the 1700s
173 .
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and its tripartite racial order most clearly reflected this amalgam of different people,
cultures, languages, and experiences, but the increasing number of Latinos in postKatrina New Orleans has the potential to reinforce these ideas of culture established in
New Orleans so long ago. Taco trucks and Spanish-speaking radio stations are among the
new additions to New Orleans. As Committee for a Better New Orleans president Keith
»174

Twitchell noted, “[tjhere's plenty of room for a little more spice in the gumbo.

Although examples like these serve to exhibit the changes and reforms taking
place in the city, serious issues still remain. Many of the reforms have not yet been
fully—or even partially—realized, and it will take many more years to see concrete and
meaningful changes. Major problems throughout all sectors continue to jeopardize
African Americans’ and Latinos’ ability to succeed in New Orleans. Despite efforts at
unity and understanding, strife and miscommunication continue to characterize
relationships between African Americans and Latinos. Katrina was responsible for either
creating or exacerbating many of these problems. But even with this knowledge of the
problems that Katrina caused and compounded, there still remains a hope for the future.
As Dana Kaplan from New Orleans’ Safe Streets/Strong Communities explained,
although these problems persist, the small but growing reform movements within the
African American and Latino communities have “ripple effects” that reach into their
175

communities.

With increased cooperation, alliance, and commitment to reform, these

ripples have the ability to spread throughout New Orleans in the coming years and bring
about meaningful and permanent change.
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Keith Twitchell, interviewed by Caroline Gillespie, October 29, 2012, phone.
Dana Kaplan, interviewed by Caroline Gillespie, March 26, 2013, phone.
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